7. Mr Kirk raises a large number of prospective grounds of appeal. It is unnecessary to go through every point in detail. His first group of grounds are that there was a real possibility of bias on the part of the judge, His Honour Judge Curran. However, we have examined the complaints which are made in that respect and they do not begin to make good a case that there was any possibility of such bias, whether actual or perceived. Secondly, Mr Kirk complains that he did not have the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses who had been prosecution witnesses in his original trial for harassment, including the psychiatrist Dr Williams, that he was not allowed disclosure of documents relating to that original trial and that he was denied the opportunity of calling witnesses who would have spoken either to the issues whether he had been committing harassment or to the underlying dispute from which all this arose. But as the judge pointed out, and as we have already said, all such evidence and disclosure was completely irrelevant to the proceedings for breach of the restraining order where the issues were as we have indicated. Dr Williams, for example, could have given no relevant evidence about any of them.

8. In our judgment, the judge was clearly right to prevent Mr Kirk from using the trial for breach of the restraining order as a platform for re-visiting other matters which were entirely irrelevant to those proceedings. He was right to keep the trial firmly focused on what was relevant.

9. There is a complaint also that the jury requested sight of the original custody notes and court log relating to the proceedings in the Magistrates' Court but that the judge refused this request. However, so far as we can see from the transcript of the proceedings there is no trace of anything of that nature having been requested by the jury.

10. Mr Kirk says also that the case should have been withdrawn from the jury as the prosecution evidence relating to the service of the restraining order on him was so unreliable that no jury could properly convict. In our judgment there is nothing in this point. Even if the evidence of Mr Williams and Mr Barker, to whom we have already referred, was not identical in every particular, their evidence that the restraining order had indeed been served on Mr Kirk was certainly such that it was open to the jury to convict.

11. This morning Mr Kirk has amplified the material in his written proposed grounds to which we have just referred, with a further summary of why he says that the conviction was unsafe. But it is clear that those matters which he has set out in a two page document provided to us relate, save for one point, to the underlying issues as to the rights and wrongs of whether he should have been convicted of harassment or as to the original examination of him by Dr Williams which is entirely irrelevant to the issues as to breach of the restraining order. The other matter which he raises relates to the service of the order upon him, which was a matter for the jury to determine in the light of the evidence at the trial, which they did.

12. He applies also, as we indicated at the outset, for an adjournment on the basis that there is new evidence relating to something that Dr Williams did last July, that is to say July 2012, but again that seems to us, whatever that may be about, to have no possible